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Abstract
The design of mechanisms that encourage pro-social be-
haviours in populations of self-regarding agents is recognised
as a major theoretical challenge within several areas of so-
cial, life and engineering sciences. When interference from
external parties is considered, several heuristics have been
identified as capable of engineering a desired collective be-
haviour at a minimal cost. However, these studies neglect
the diverse nature of contexts and social structures that char-
acterise real-world populations. Here we analyse the impact
of diversity by means of scale-free interaction networks with
high and low levels of clustering, and test various interference
mechanisms using simulations of agents facing a cooperative
dilemma. Our results show that interference on scale-free net-
works is not trivial and that distinct levels of clustering react
differently to each interference mechanism. As such, we ar-
gue that no tailored response fits all scale-free networks and
present which mechanisms are more efficient at fostering co-
operation in both types of networks. Finally, we discuss the
pitfalls of considering reckless interference mechanisms.
Introduction
The problem of explaining collective behaviours among
self-interested individuals in evolving dynamical systems
has fascinated researchers from many fields, and is a well
studied research topic in evolutionary game theory (Hof-
bauer and Sigmund, 1998). It can be found in a variety
of real-world situations, ranging from ecosystems to human
organisations and technological innovations and social net-
works (Santos et al., 2006; Sigmund et al., 2001; Raghunan-
dan and Subramanian, 2012; Han et al., 2019). It has been
also investigated in various Artificial Life systems such as
swarm-based systems and biologically inspired artificial so-
cial systems (Nitschke, 2005; Bonabeau et al., 1999).
In this context, cooperation is typically assumed to
emerge from the combined actions of individuals within the
system. However, in many scenarios, such behaviours are
advocated and promoted by an external party, which is not
part of the system, calling for a new set of heuristics capa-
ble of engineering a desired collective behaviour in a self-
organised complex system Penn et al. (2010). For instance,
if one considers a near future, where hybrid societies com-
prising humans and machines shall prevail, it is important to
identify the most effective incentives to be included to lever-
aging cooperation in such hybrid collectives (Paiva et al.,
2018). In a different context, let us consider a wildlife man-
agement organisation (e.g., the WWF) that aims to main-
tain a desired level of biodiversity in a particular region. In
order to do that, the organisation, not being part of the re-
gion’s eco-system, has to decide whether to modify the cur-
rent population of some species, and if so, then when, and
in what degree to interfere in the eco-system (i.e., to modify
the composition of the population) (Levin, 2000). Since a
more impactful intervention typically implies larger costs in
terms of human resources and equipment, the organisation
has to achieve a balance between pregnant wildlife manage-
ment and a low total investment cost. Moreover, due to the
evolutionary dynamics of the eco-system (e.g., frequency
and structure dependence) (Santos et al., 2006), undesired
behaviours can reoccur over time, for example when the in-
terference was not sufficiently strong in the past. Given this,
the decision-maker also has to take into account the fact that
it will have to repeatedly interfere in the eco-system in order
to sustain the level of biodiversity over time. That is, it has
to find an efficient interference mechanism that leads to its
desired goals, while also minimising the its total cost.
This question has been studied previously in the con-
text of populations distributed on regular graphs, namely
the complete and the square lattice graphs (Han and Tran-
Thanh, 2018; Han et al., 2018). In this type of network,
every individual has the same degree of connectivity (i.e.
the number of neighbours). However, in social graphs and
real-world populations, individuals typically have a diverse
social connectivity (Albert and Baraba´si, 2002; Santos et al.,
2008). Hence, in this paper, we study cost-effective interfer-
ence in heterogeneous networks, namely different types of
scale-free networks, which have been shown to well capture
real-world networks (such as the World Wide Web) (New-
man, 2018). In particular, we consider populations of in-
dividuals distributed in a scale-free network, who interact
with their neighbours via the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD), where uncooperative behaviour is preferred over co-
operation (Sigmund et al., 2001; Santos et al., 2006). As an
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outsider decision-maker, we aim to promote cooperation by
interfering in the system, rewarding particular agents in the
population at specific moments.
The research question here is to identify when and how
much to invest (on individuals distributed in a network) at
each time step, in order to achieve our desired ratio of coop-
eration within the system such that the total cost of interfer-
ence is minimised, taking into account the fact that individ-
uals might have different levels of social connectivity. For
instance, we might wonder whether it is sufficient to focus
the investment only on highly connected cooperators since
they are more influential, thereby leading to cost-efficiency?
Do we need to take into account a neighbourhood’s cooper-
ativeness level which was shown to play an important role in
square lattice networks (Han et al., 2018)? Also, when local
information is not available and only global statistics can be
used in the decision making process, how different are the
results in heterogeneous networks, in comparison to regular
graphs?
To answer these questions, this paper will systematically
investigate different general classes or approaches of inter-
ference mechanisms, which are based i) on the global popu-
lation statistics such as its current composition, ii) a node’s
social connectivity in the network and iii) the neighbourhood
properties such as the local cooperativeness level.
Our results show that interference in a heterogeneous net-
work exhibits a significantly more complex challenge (to
be cost-effective while ensuring high levels of cooperation)
and much richer nonlinear dynamic behaviours, compared
to regular graphs. For instance, in both well-mixed and
square lattice graphs, a greater per-individual investment
cost would ensure at least the same level of cooperation
since it gives each cooperator a better fighting chance for
survival against defectors. However, this is not the case in
the context of heterogeneous networks as increasing the per-
individual investment cost could actually be detrimental for
cooperation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next
section provides a brief overview of the related work, which
is followed by a detailed description of our model, methods
and its results. The paper ends with a final discussion.
Related Work
The problem of explaining the emergence and stability of
cooperative behaviour has been studied intensively in many
fields, from Social Sciences, Economics, Physics to Multi-
agent Systems and Artificial Life (Hofbauer and Sigmund,
1998; Nowak, 2006; Han et al., 2012; Nitschke, 2005). Sev-
eral mechanisms responsible for the evolution of coopera-
tion have been identified, including direct and indirect reci-
procity (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005), kin and group se-
lections (Traulsen and Nowak, 2006), network reciprocity
(Santos and Pacheco, 2005; Santos et al., 2006), punishment
and rewarding (Sigmund et al., 2001), and cognitive mecha-
nisms (Han et al., 2011, 2012). However, these mechanisms
do not consider how cooperation can be promoted by an ex-
ternal party. Instead, they are incorporated as part of individ-
ual strategic behaviours, in order to study how they evolve
and whether their evolution promotes a better outcome for
cooperative behaviour. In contrast, our interference mech-
anisms are external, i.e. they are not incorporated into the
individual strategy.
In addition, the aim of our mechanisms is to minimise the
cost of interference while guaranteeing high levels of coop-
eration, contrary to past literature where the cost optimisa-
tion is often omitted. In this respect, our work is also dif-
ferent from the modelling works of institutional incentives
to encourage cooperation through costly reward and punish-
ment (Sigmund et al., 2010; Vasconcelos et al., 2013) as well
as through enforcing agreements (Han et al., 2017).
Similarly, our work also differs from EGT literature on
optimal control in networked populations (Riehl and Cao,
2017; Ramazi and Cao, 2015), where cost-efficiency is not
considered. Instead, these works on controllability focus on
identifying which individuals or nodes are the most impor-
tant to control (i.e. where individuals can be assigned strate-
gies as control inputs), for different population structures.
Closely related to the current work are the analyses on
well-mixed populations (i.e. having a fully connected graph
structure) (Han and Tran-Thanh, 2018) and on square-lattice
structured populations (Han et al., 2018), which study cost-
efficient interference on the aforementioned types of net-
works, respectively. Moving to the more complex scenario
of heterogeneous networks where individuals might have
different degrees of connectivity (i.e. the number of neigh-
bours), an interference mechanism might need to take this
new dimension into account to be cost-efficient. As shown
below, cost-efficient interference mechanisms that incorpo-
rate this information can outperform those who only con-
sider global population statistics and neighbourhood coop-
erative properties as in previous works.
Also related to current work is the research of cooper-
ation in social networks where changes are initiated from
inside the system (Raghunandan and Subramanian, 2012;
Franks et al., 2013, 2014). Among them, more relevant to
our paper is the recent work by Franks et al. (Franks et al.,
2014), which has explored the use of influencers on complex
networks. However, these influencers are also part of the
system and thus, similar to the cases mentioned above, this
work does not consider external interference mechanisms.
Given this, it does not address similar decision-making prob-
lems that we examine here.
Models and Methods
Prisoner’s Dilemma on Scale Free Networks
We consider a population of agents on scale-free networks of
contacts (SF NOCs)— a widely adopted heterogeneous pop-
ulation structure in population dynamics and evolutionary
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games (for a survey, see (Szabo´ and Fath, 2007)). We focus
our analysis on the efficiency of various interference mecha-
nisms in spatial settings, adopting an agent-based model di-
rectly comparable with the setup of recent lab experiments
on cooperation (Rand et al., 2014).
Initially each agent is designated either as a cooperator
(C) or defector (D) with equal probability. Agents’ inter-
action is modelled using the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma
game, where mutual cooperation (mutual defection) yields
the reward R (penalty P ) and unilateral cooperation gives
the cooperator the sucker’s payoff S and the defector the
temptation T . As a popular interaction model of structured
populations (Szabo´ and Fath, 2007), we adopt the following
scaled payoff matrix of the PD: T = b, R = 1, P = S = 0.
(with 1 < b ≤ 2). We adopt a weak version of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma in spite of cooperator prevalence shown in previ-
ous works on scale-free networks of contacts (Santos et al.,
2008), so as to have a direct link of comparison with studies
on the effects of rewarding mechanisms in different types of
networks (Han et al., 2018).
For SF networks with low clustering we adopt the famous
Baraba´si-Albert (BA) model (Albert and Baraba´si, 2002).
Starting from a complete graph of m0 nodes, at every time-
step one adds new node with m ≤ m0 edges linking to
existing nodes, which are chosen with a probability that is
proportional to the number of links that the existing nodes
already have. The new node always connects to m distinct
nodes, and duplicate connections at each time step are not al-
lowed. The average connectivity of the network is z = 2m.
To obtain a SF network with high clustering, we resort to
the Dorogovtsev-Mendes-Samukhin (DMS) model (Doro-
govtsev et al., 2001). Similarly to the BA model, we also
have growth, yet each new node attaches to both ends of a
randomly chosen edge. As a result, we favor the creation of
triangular relations between individuals, thereby greatly en-
hancing the clustering coefficient of the final network. As in
the BA model, the process of choosing the edge implicitly
promotes the preferential choice of highly connected nodes,
leading to the same degree distribution. The edges chosen at
each time step are distinct and multiple connections between
the same two nodes are not allowed. This network also has
an average connectivity of z = 2m. Both types of SF NOCs
are pre-generated, before the strategies of players are desig-
nated and before the first generation commences playing.
At each time step or generation, each agent plays the PD
with its immediate neighbours. The score for each agent
is the sum of the payoffs in these encounters. Before the
start of the next generation, the conditions of interference
are checked for each agent and, if they qualify, the external
decision maker increases their payoff. Multiple mechanisms
(i.e. multiple conditions) can be active at once. At the start
of the next generation, each agent’s strategy is changed to
that of its highest scored neighbour (Nowak and May, 1992;
Szabo´ and Fath, 2007). Our analysis will be primarily based
on this deterministic, standard evolutionary process in order
to focus on understanding the cost-efficiency of different in-
terference mechanisms.
We simulate this evolutionary process until a stationary
state or a cyclic pattern is reached. The simulations converge
quickly, with the exception of some cyclic patterns which do
eventually reach a stationary state. Because this work stud-
ies cost effective intervention, these rarely-occurring pat-
terns which inherently invite very large total costs are es-
caped early by running simulations for only 75 generations,
at which point the accumulated costs are excessive enough
for this mechanism to not be of interest. Moreover, the re-
sults are averaged for the last 25 generations of the simu-
lations for a clear and fair comparison (e.g. due to cyclic
patterns). In order to improve accuracy related to the ran-
domness of network topology in scale-free networks, each
set of parameter values is ran on 10 different graphs for both
types of SF NOCs. Furthermore, the results for each com-
bination of network and parameter values are obtained from
averaging 30 independent realisations. It is important to note
that the distribution of cooperators and defectors on the net-
work is different for every realisation.
Note that we do not consider mutations or random explo-
rations in this work. Thus, whenever the population reaches
a homogeneous state (i.e. when the population consists of
100% of agents adopting the same strategy), it will remain
in that state regardless of interference. Hence, whenever de-
tecting such a state, no further interference will be made.
Cost-Efficient Interference in Networks
As already stated, we aim to study how one can efficiently
interfere in a structured population to achieve high levels of
cooperation while minimising the cost of interference. An
investment in a cooperator consists of a cost θ > 0 (to the
external decision-maker/investor). This investment is added
to the payoff of an agent if certain conditions are met. Each
mechanism has different conditions for investment. In par-
ticular, we investigate whether global interference mecha-
nisms (where investments are triggered based on network
level information) or their local counterparts (where invest-
ments are based on local neighbourhood information) lead
to successful behaviour with better cost efficiency. To do so,
we consider three main classes of interference mechanisms
based i) on the global composition of the population, ii) the
node’s connectivity in the network and iii) the neighbour-
hood cooperation level.
1. Population composition based (POP): In this class
of mechanisms the decision to interfere (i.e. to invest on all
cooperators in the population) is based on the current com-
position of the population (we denote xC the number of co-
operators currently in the population). Namely, they invest
when the number of cooperators in the population is below a
certain threshold, pC (i.e. xC ≤ pC), for 1 ≤ pC ≤ z. They
do not invest otherwise (xC > pC). The value pC describes
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how widespread the defection strategy should be to trigger
the support of cooperators’ survival against defectors.
2. Node Influence (NI): For this mechanism, the decision
to invest in a given cooperator is dependent on how influen-
tial its node is (i.e. how many connections end in that node).
Whereas POP considered the composition of the population,
NI looks at how connected a node is in the network. That
is to say, the decision-maker invests in a cooperator node
C when the number of its immediate neighbours (|kC |) di-
vided by the maximum connectivity (max|kI |) is above a
threshold of influence cI , for 0 ≤ cI ≤ 1. Otherwise, i.e.
when 0 ≤ cI ≤ |kC |
max|ki| , no investment is made. The value
cI describes how influential a cooperator node should be to
trigger an investment into its survival.
3. Local cooperation based (LC): In this class of mecha-
nisms, the decision to invest in a given cooperator is based
on the cooperativeness level in that cooperator’s neighbour-
hood. Namely, the decision-maker invests in a cooperator
when the number of its cooperative neighbours is below a
certain threshold, nC , for 0 ≤ nC ≤ |kC |; otherwise, no in-
vestment is made. By varying the local cooperation thresh-
old nC , we aim to provide an answer to the important ques-
tion of how much cooperation is required in a neighbour-
hood before the investor can choose to withhold the inter-
vention and save the interference cost and under which con-
ditions this can happen. For instance, one can ask whether
it is safe to withdraw action in a neighbourhood without af-
fecting the outcome, therefore eliminating unnecessary in-
terference.
Interestingly, these mechanisms require different levels of
information which may or may not be readily available in the
given network. In some cases, such as social networks, the
connectivity (i.e. the number of friends) of a node is virtu-
ally free information which requires no effort on the part of
the external decision maker to discern. On the other hand,
other mechanisms such as POP, inherently require more in-
formation about the population and the level of coopera-
tiveness in different parts of the network. POP is a broad
mechanism which only requires knowledge about overall
cooperativeness, but LC invites even more detailed obser-
vations, in order to determine the cooperativeness in each
neighbourhood. Combining NI with LC generally does not
require any more observation than LC by itself. Our study of
neighbourhood based interference does not take into account
the cost of gathering information, it is a direct comparison
between perceived gains in cooperation and the associated
per-individual cost of interference set out in the interference
mechanisms.
Results
In contrast to the study on square lattice networks (Han
et al., 2018), as detailed below for each interference mecha-
nism, we found that performing cost-effective interventions
on SF NOCs presents multiple concerns. In a square lat-
tice population, more detailed observations resulted in more
effective intervention with a better outcome. On the other
hand, more knowledge about the population in SF NOCs
simply reduces the risk of interfering to the detriment of co-
operators. In other words, interfering in SF NOCs without
adequate knowledge should be approached cautiously or it
could act to the benefit of defectors. This issue is prevalent
in the BA model and is not representative of the DMS model.
Positive interference in BA models broadly requires very
high θ values (often orders of magnitude higher than similar
mechanisms performed on square lattice populations) or a
blanketing mechanism that targets all or almost all coopera-
tors, even those which are not necessarily in danger of con-
verting to D. Converging to 100% C is very difficult unless
both of these conditions are met and this introduces multiple
concerns in the role of an exogenous interfering party. We
avoid focusing on solutions where the per-generation cost
is excessive, as it is unlikely for any institution to be able
to produce such exorbitant sums in one generation, as re-
quired by these heterogeneous networks, instead we focus
on effective intervention with manageable amounts of per-
generation cost. In the following subsections we detail the
results obtained for each interference mechanism.
Population Based
We compare population-based interference mechanisms, i.e.
POP, on the two different types of SF NOCs, the BA model
and the DMS model, namely how efficient the mechanisms
are at promoting cooperation with minimal total cost (See
Figure 1).
For SF NOCs with a large clustering coefficient, we found
that it is very easy to escape cyclic patterns and a minimal
amount of interference, enabling the population to quickly
converge to 100% cooperation. Without any interference,
the frequency of Cs is greatly dependent on the initial distri-
bution of strategies in the network and there is a large prob-
ability that Ds will quickly overtake the Cs, if the oldest (i.e.
the most connected) nodes are initially Ds. Conversely, ap-
plying even a minimal amount of interference to Cs, at any
point in the rapid decline of C population, helps Cs in con-
verging to 100% of cooperation. Because of this, investing
any more than minimal amounts of (≈ θ), as well as inter-
fering when the average cooperation is above 50%, increases
the total cost with little to no benefit to the frequency of Cs.
Note that the results are consistent for a larger cost θ. We
plot up to θ ≤ 5 just for the sake of clear presentation.
In direct contrast with our findings for the DMS model, an
external decision maker should only interfere in BA models
with great care, as investing without discrimination could
lead to a lower cooperation frequency when compared to no
interference (See Figure 1). We observe that using certain
values of θ negatively impacts average cooperation levels
across a wide range of pC values. For these undesired val-
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Figure 1: Population-based (POP) interference for BA model
(top row) vs DMS model (bottom row), for varying per-individual
cost of investment θ, as well as the threshold of population coop-
eration pC . The left column reports the frequency of cooperation
while the right one reports the total cost required. We note in partic-
ular, the significant difference in total cost between the two models.
Parameters: b = 1.8; n = 5000; z = 4 (average node connectiv-
ity).
ues of θ, cyclic patterns would form which ultimately help
Ds by maintaining C players in clusters dominated by Ds
(see Figure 2). This type of negative impact occurs when
the θ value is not high enough for Cs to be able to con-
vert a cluster to cooperation, but not low enough as to let
the Ds converge to 100% D in that cluster. Many of these
cyclic patterns eventually settle to 100% C if the simulation
is ran for a sufficient number of generations (≈ 250). We
note that the accumulated cost of interference at the end of
the long-lasting cyclic patterns is prohibitively large, which
make such values of θ undesirable for an external decision
maker with limited resources.
Positive interference in BA models can be achieved by
selecting very low or extremely high values for θ, with a
high value for pC . BA models converge to a high C fre-
quency even without interference, so it is important to select
a value for pC that will allow interference after the system
has reached a stable state (typically pC > 90). In terms of
total cost, it is more efficient to select very low values of θ,
but the overall benefit to cooperation levels is much lower
than with very high values of θ. Therefore, it is up to the ex-
ternal decision maker to decide if the increase in cooperation
is worth the higher cost in resources.
Node Influence
When an exogenous decision maker takes into account only
how connected a node is, see Figure 3, i.e. how influential it
is in the network, it becomes very unlikely for interference
to provide a meaningful improvement to levels of C in BA
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Figure 2: Evolution of cooperation: BA Model (top) vs DMS
model (bottom), for θ = 5, pC = 80. C and D frequencies are
shown in green and red, respectively. The left column shows the
network without interference, while the right one shows the same
network after population-based (POP) interference. Other parame-
ters: b = 1.8; n = 5000; z = 4 (average node connectivity).
models. Very low values of cI (≈ 0.1), coupled with small
to intermediate values of θ can cause a decrease in the av-
erage cooperation, forming previously discussed cyclic pat-
terns (See Figure 2). For all other values, cooperation seems
to be very inert. This phenomenon can be explained by the
fact that clusters have already been decided in favour of co-
operators and all that remains of defectors survives in a sta-
ble state around non-influential nodes. By targeting only
the most influential cooperators, the external decision maker
can have no impact on the less connected nodes, which en-
able the survival of defectors. Therefore, only a blanketing
mechanism at very low cI can reach the lowly connected
cooperators and produce an increase in the average coopera-
tion. This type of blanketing mechanism with low cI quickly
accumulates large amounts of total investment cost.
In SF networks with a high clustering coefficient, on the
other hand, one can ensure convergence to 100% C in a cost
effective way by selecting intermediary values of cI (typi-
cally ≈ cI = 0.6) and low values for θ. An interesting ob-
servation is that contrary to POP, interference does not mean
that the system will converge to 100% C. Anything more
than minimal amounts of cI show no increase to average
of cooperation except at extremely high θ values. In other
words, it appears that D clusters are very difficult to shift
after the initial distribution of strategies on the network and
the amounts of fitness they acquire are almost impossible to
match except for a very large individual investment into the
oldest and, implicitly, most influential, nodes. Similarly to
the effect of NI on the BA model, a blanketing mechanism
encourages the formation of C dominated neighbourhoods,
which in turn generates a greater fitness than anything but
very large values of individual investment θ. Interestingly,
increasing individual investment at anything but low values
of the influence threshold cI actually promotes defection by
enabling the temporary survival of cooperators connected to
defectors which are centers of hubs. This, in turn, allows de-
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Figure 3: Node influence based (NI) interference for BA model
(top row) vs DMS model (middle row) and detailed view of
DMS model (bottom row), for varying per-individual cost of in-
vestment θ, as well as the threshold for cooperator influence cI .
The left column reports the frequency of cooperation while the
right one reports the total cost required. The ranges for θ and
cI are scaled for clear presentation. Parameters: b = 1.8; n =
5000; z = 4 (average node connectivity).
fector hubs to convert any remaining cooperator hubs. It is
important to note that the initial distribution of players in the
hubs is ultimately what determi es which way the network
will converge, so this type of interference does not produce
any decrease in cooperation, as is the case of the BA model.
Local Cooperation
By the same token as earlier observations, interference on
the BA model comes with the risk of reducing overall co-
operation. What is more, LC based interference produces
negative results for a wider range of parameters than any
other mechanism (See Figure 4). That notwithstanding, in-
vesting smartly using the LC mechanism can lead to 100%
cooperation, whereas the other mechanisms struggle. The
key to such smart investments is in choosing a value for the
threshold of local cooperation nC which approaches the up-
per limit (nC → 1), with individual investment θ values
high enough to convert defectors situated in cooperator clus-
ters. As the value of nC approaches 1, redundant investment
decreases. With higher values of θ, the network converges
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Figure 4: Local cooperation based interference for BA model
(top row) vs DMS model (bottom row), for varying per-individual
cost of investment θ, scaled for clear presentation, as well as the
threshold of neighbourhood cooperation nC . The left column re-
ports the frequency of cooperation while the right one reports the
total cost required. Parameters: b = 1.8; n = 5000; z = 4
(average node connectivity).
more rapidly and therefore overall cost is reduced. There-
fore, LC based interference can be regarded as the least risk
averse, but potentially the most impactful given realistic val-
ues of per-individual investment θ.
With the exception of a small range of values for per-
individual investment θ, the LC interference mechanism
achieves a very high average cooperation for the clustering
network. This reinforces the assumption that interference at
any point in the decline of cooperation is enough to shift the
scales and enables cooperators to overtake the defectors. On
the basis thereof, an external decision maker can reduce the
costs of interference by selecting very low values for nC
in combination with a high enough individual investment
θ. For intermediate values of the local cooperation thresh-
old nC in combination with not high enough θ values, an
interesting phenomenon is observed: the promotion of the
survival of defectors by enabling the survival of cooperator
nodes without actually giving them a chance of converting
defectors in their neighbourhood, thereby allowing the de-
fectors to exploit those cooperators.
Combining Node Influence and Local Cooperation
Due to the ease of acquiring information related to node con-
nectivity in some types of networks, we test a combination
of the two mechanisms where a cooperator node receives the
individual investment only if both thresholds, local coopera-
tion nC and node influence cI are met. Our results show that
this is a risk-averse interference mechanism for low values
of cI (See Figure 5).
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Figure 5: Combination between node influence and local co-
operation based interference for BA model (top row) vs DMS
model (bottom row), for varying per-individual cost of investment
θ and threshold of neighbourhood cooperation nC , for cI = 0.05.
The left column reports the frequency of cooperation while the
right one reports the total cost required. Parameters: b = 1.8; n =
5000; z = 4 (average node connectivity).
For the BA model, the possibility of inappropriate inter-
ference which leads to cyclic patterns is virtually eliminated
even for very low values of cI . We note that for very high
values of per-individual investment θ, there is a marked in-
crease in levels of cooperation while maintaining cost effi-
ciency, if a high enough value for nC is selected, similarly
to our results for the LC-based mechanism. In that case, in-
troducing the added parameter of node influence serves no
purpose and reduces perceived gains to cooperation.
In the case of the SF NOC with a high prevalence of
triangular motifs (DMS), the combination mechanism pro-
duces similar results to the ones observed for solely LC-
based interference, but with slightly reduced costs across the
range of parameter values and with a more predictable cor-
relation between threshold values, per-individual investment
cost and gains in cooperation. The maximum gains to levels
of cooperation are reduced slightly when compared to the
single two mechanisms, with the exception of very high θ.
Following these findings, we have shown that an inte-
grated approach to interference would work best when the
nature of the network is ambiguous. In that case, this type
of interference would promote converge to cooperation in
the case of the DMS model, without risking the decrease in
cooperation seen in the BA Model for the two interference
mechanisms applied independently.
Conclusions and Future Work
In summary, this paper aims to determine how best an ex-
ternal decision maker could incentivise a population of au-
tonomous agents facing a cooperative dilemma to fulfil a
coveted collective state. We build on a previous account
which identified the most effective mechanisms to foster co-
operative scenarios in spatially distributed systems in regular
graph structured populations of agents, but instead we con-
sider two popular models of scale-free networks of contacts.
In particular, we try to understand if the insights set out in
the context of regular graphs remain applicable to hetero-
geneous models, as well as exploring an additional avenue
of interference enabled by the variance in node connectivity.
To address these issues, we have combined an evolutionary
game theoretic model with several incentive mechanisms in
two types of pre-generated networks characterised by prefer-
ential attachment, with different clustering coefficients. We
argue that this problem cannot be solved trivially and we
show that transitivity (i.e. the global clustering coefficient)
should be the driving force behind the choice of an interfer-
ence mechanism in promoting cooperation in heterogeneous
network structures, as well as its application.
Our comparison between the two types of SF networks
provides valuable insights regarding the importance of clus-
tering in the outcome of cooperation. We found that a large
clustering coefficient allows for successful, cost-effective in-
terference, indeed even when disregarding a full compre-
hension of the population and its tendencies. These re-
sults are of particular interest, given that most SF networks
portray high clustering, such as in the case of social ties
where friends are likely to be friends of each other (New-
man, 2018). Moreover, heterogeneous scenarios inhibited
by spatial constraints (e.g. in highly urbanised areas or even
the allotment of rangelands such as pastures) also impose
some measure of clustering.
In the absence of clustering, we found that impetuously
rewarding cooperators can lead to cyclic patterns which
damage cooperation in the long run, and we show how this
can be avoided when a decision maker lacks information
about the level of clustering of the network. We observe a
large negative impact on the cost of rewarding cooperators in
the case of a low clustering coefficient, and provide insights
on how it can be reduced. Moreover, we show that ignoring
lowly connected individuals leads to unprofitable and even
futile intervention irrespective of network transitivity.
Our future work aims to provide a comprehensive ex-
ploration of external interference on multiple types of net-
works while adopting different strategy update forms, such
as stochastic learning (Szabo´ and Fath, 2007). We envis-
age that stochasticity will increase the overall cooperation
and reduce the occurrence of cyclic patterns due to reck-
less interference, or eliminate them altogether. Furthermore,
we plan to examine spatially-motivated interference mech-
anisms for heterogeneous networks, encouraging the for-
mation of links between nodes or on the contrary, cutting
off said links. The inherently high levels of cooperation
in heterogeneous networks motivate us to experiment with
a higher bias towards defection or mechanisms specifically
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aimed at lowly connected nodes.
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